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PROTECTING "KILLER CRocs" 
AND "FANTASY FOOTBALL" 
THE ETHICS OF COPYRIGHT LAw 
Susy Franker 
In this article Susy Frankel discusses the iustifications for copyright law which form the 
ethical basis of copyright protection m New Zealand. It then considers how those justifications 
are reflected in the case law by examining two Court of Appeal judgments. The author 
concludes that at times the reasoning and results of individual cases lose sight of the 
justifications for copyright protection. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is trite to state that the justifications for, and ethical bases of, legal rights are 
important. Paradoxically, however, this is often forgotten. Although the black letter law can 
easily be consulted and applied, the ethical decisions which are the basis of that law should 
not be forgotten and should be discernible from the body of case law which they have 
spawned. 
The ethical bases of most intellectual property rights are difficult to pinpoint. The policy 
reasons for such rights are many and varied. They include justifications based on principles 
of reward for labour, skill or investment and the notion that such reward provides the 
incentive to create or invent. Most intellectual property texts include an introduction which 
discusses the history of such rights and their emergence rather than an analysis of 
justifications for their existence and scope from a political or economic viewpoint. 1 When 
viewed from an economic perspective there are many similarities between the different 
intellectual property rights, but this article is primarily concerned with copyright. The main 
Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
See for example Brown & Grant The Law of Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1989). 
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historical justification for copyright is that it provides an incentive for the creation of new 
copyright works. This can conveniently be described as the "incentive theory". 
In addition to the incentive theory there are other justifications for providing copyright 
protection. These include the creation and maintenance of copyright producing industries. 
For example the film business, the music recording industry and computer software 
production. It is unrealistic to discuss the justifications for copyright and to ignore the huge 
benefits that some national economies have through copyright dependent industries. 
Intellectual property rights are an integral part of New Zealand's and other countries' 
economic policy. The theme of this article is not to analyse whether the economic policy, or 
any of the other justifications, behind our copyright law are just, but to examine how the 
case law reflects them. This article outlines the justifications for copyright and the ethical 
bases from which those justifications have emerged. The article then examines how two New 
Zealand Court of Appeal judgments reflect those justifications. The writer respectfully 
conclU<ies the Court of Appeal does not always give due consideration to the justifications 
for copyright protection. 
I THE "ETHICS" OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
A The Incentive Theory 
In this article the term "incentive theory" describes the concept that an author requires 
an incentive to create products of the intellect and that such an incentive takes the form of 
the rewards of copyright. "Incentive" in this context includes both the concepts of 
motivation and reward. The incentive theory relies on the concept that creators of copyright 
works require an incentive to initiate or continue their creations. Although some 
commentators argue that this is not so: "Throughout most of our human history there existed 
no concept of intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, humans still produced technological 
and cultural artefacts."2 
The incentive theory provokes two questions. Who is in fact rewarded and who· has 
been motivated? The term "author" refers to a creator of a work/ but the beneficiaries of 
the reward are not only authors. Publishers, producers and the like also partake of any 
reward.4 
R V Bettig Copyrighting Culture- The Political Economy of Intellectual Property (Westview Press, 
Boulder Colorado, 1996) 25. 
Copyright Act 1994, s 5(1). 
In some cases the publisher or producer may be the first owner of copyright. For example see 
section 21(2) and section 5 (2) of the Copyright Act 1994. 
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Modern publishing practice requires an author of a book to assign copyright to the 
publisher. The publisher then has the obligation to publish the book and the exclusive right 
to authorise any subsequent use of the copyright. The publisher shares the incentive for the 
author to create another book. In a technological context this translates to the investment 
that companies make in research and development of computer software. Unless there is a 
reward mechanism which ensures a substantial return on such products no incentive exists 
for companies to invest in the development of computer programs. Thus, the rewards of 
copyright are hardly authors' exclusive domain. They belong to publishers, distributors and 
every business with a link to copyright industries. 
B The Role of Authors' Rights 
This section considers whether authors' rights have played a role in the development of 
modern copyright law. New Zealand copyright law is now governed by the Copyright Act 
1994. This Act is substantially based on the English Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988. The New Zealand predecessors to the 1994 Ad are also based on the English 
equivalents.6 Therefore the history of English copyright law is relevant to a consideration 
of the justifications for New Zealand's copyright law. This history is riddled with conflict 
between the rights of authors as creators of copyright works and the rights of publishers as 
disseminators of those works. 
One can trace English copyright legislation back to the 18th century and more 
particularly the Statute of Anne of 1709.7 The Statute of Anne's preamble records a lofty 
ethical basis for its existence:H 
An Act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the 
authors or purchasers of such copies. 
The Statute of Anne was enacted after substantial lobbying by the Stationer's Company. 
Royal charter established the Stationer's Company in 1557. The charter gave the Stationer's 
Company a monopoly over printing in England. This monopoly lasted for the next 150 
years.9 The Stationer's Company issued exclusive licences to its members to print and 
New Zealand's previous copyright legislation was the Copyright Act 1962, Copyright Act 1913 
and a number of English Acts. See Brown & Grant above n 1, 226-227. 
See England's Copyright Act 1956 and Copyright Act 1911. 
Prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne a form of common law copyright protection which 
existed, but there were no decisions of common law courts upholding any form of copyright. See 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (2nd ed, Butterworths, 
London, 1995) 18-20. 
British Statutes (1709) 8 Anne Chapter XIX. 
A Star Chamber Declaration of 1586 limited the number of Master Printers in England to 25. 
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publish. This had an effect which resembles today's exclusive right of copyright owners to 
control the copying of their works, but was clearly a way of controlling competition. In 
addition, the motivation behind the existence of the Stationer's Company was equally, if not 
more so, that of censorship. A leading copyright text describes the Stationer's Company as 
"a cartel of booksellers, and mainly London booksellers at that".10 It was a form of guild 
which had a monopoly on printing. The focus was on the role of printers. There is no 
evidence that the concern to control printing was in any way a reflection of concern for 
authors' rights.11 
When the Stationer's Company lost its printing privileges in the late 17th century its 
members lobbied for control over the copying of printed works on its register and this led to 
the Statute of Anne. The statute provided a 14 year right for owners of books to control the 
publishing of those books. n 
The right of printers was thus firmly established in English law. However, author's 
rights were not so firmly established. The emergence of printing as a means of income for 
authors coincided with the emergence of the theories of John Locke that people have 
property rights in the fruits of their labour. 13 Exactly what role Locke played in developing 
authors' rights is a matter of some historical debate.14 However the concept of an author 
having a natural right to the fruits of his15 labour began to emerge as a leading argument on 
which the Stationer's Company lobbied for the Statute of Anne. 
It is unnecessary for this article to examine either Locke or natural law theories in 
detail. The concept of labour playing a role in copyright protection has become integral 
when considering whether copyright exists in a particular work. Copyright only exists in 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
See Laddie eta!, above n 7, 20. 
At this time authors relied on patronage as a means of income. It was not until the emergence of 
widespread printing that another means of income became a possibility for authors. 
Members of the Stationer's Company also claimed there was a common law copyright which 
existed after the statutory right expired. This argument over the vestiges of common law 
copyright lingered for some time. Donaldson v Beckett 4 Burr. 2048, (1774) 98 ER 257 held the 
statutory right replaced any common law rights. The English Copyright Act 1911 made it clear 
that common law copyright did not survive that statute. 
See J Locke Two Treatises of Civil Government (Hafner Press, New York, 1947). 
There are writings which allege that Locke stated that authors have a natural right to their work. 
It has been argued that an examination of Locke's treatises reveals no reference to intellectual 
creations and therefore "it can be doubted that Locke has intellectual creativity in mind when 
arriving at his labour theory of property". SeeR Bettig above n 2, 19-21. 
The author uses the word "his" in this context rather than "his or her" to reflect the notions of 
property ownership of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
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relation to original works.16 The amount of "skill, labour or judgement" expended in 
creating the work determines whether the work is original_l 7 Indeed, whether labour on its 
own is enough to give rise to a finding of originality is a topical issue of copyright law. It is 
typified by cases involving literary compilations like databases.18 Copyright captures 
databases because they fall within the definition of literary works which includes 
compilations. 19 However, they are often the result of substantial labour rather than any 
creative originality. English authority tends toward the view that substantial labour 
expended in creating a work is enough to satisfy the originality requirement_Z0 United States 
precedent suggests that in addition to labour there must be a "modicum of creativity" for a 
work to be original.21 According to a recent High Court case the position in New Zealand is 
unclear.22 Whatever position the New Zealand courts ultimately take on the database issue 
it is clear that conceptually labour can have a role in establishing the existence of copyright. 
Modern copyright law has provided a reward for investment whether that investment be 
substantial labour, skill or even financial input. 
In 1769 the much heralded case Millar v Taylor3 gave judicial backing to author's rights. 
Lord Mansfield stated" ... it is just, that an author should reap the profits of his labour".24 
Accordingly, Lord Mansfield has taken a place in copyright history as a champion of 
authors. 
The conflict between the rights of creators as authors and publishers as disseminators 
has remained central to our copyright law. An attempt to redress the balance has emerged in 
the recent enactment of moral rights in English25 and New Zealand law. In New Zealand 
16 Above n 3, s 14. 
17 See Ladbrooke (Football) Ltd v William Hill [1964] 1 All ER 465 and University of London Press Ltd v 
University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916]2 Ch 601. 
1R See Glougau v Land Transport Safety Authority of New Zealand and New Zealand Taxi Proprietors' 
Federation Inc [1997]3 NZLR 353. 
Above n 3. s 2. 
2° For example see Water/ow Directories v Reed Information [1992] FSR 409. The European Union 
Directive on databases has meant England along with the rest of the Union has a sui generis 
regime in relation to databases. This provides the owner of the database with a right to prevent 
unfair extraction from the database. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co (1991) 113 L.Ed 2d 358. 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Colour Pages Limited (Unreported, High Court, Wellington 
Registry, 14 August 1997, CP142/97). 
(1769) 4 Burr 2303, 98 ER 201. 
Above n 23,203. 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 77-84 (England). 
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moral rights include the right to be identified as the author of a work26 and the right to object 
to derogatory treatment of a work.27 These rights relate directly to the author's personality 
and reputation and therefore cannot be alienated by the author, but they may be waived.28 
Although authors and publishers may at times have conflicting interests this should not 
overshadow their common interests, which may in tum conflict with those of users of 
copyright works. These conflicts are broadly between the right to use the work and the 
copyright owner's right to control most uses of the work.2Y 
C Balancing the Protection of Copyright Owners and the Public Interest in Using 
Copyright Works 
Another ethical factor enshrined in modem copyright law is the balancing of copyright 
protection against the interests of the public in the fair use of copyright works for purposes 
like education or to create even more works. 
While Lord Mansfield is considered to be the 19th century champion of authors, Lord 
Macaulay regarded copyright as a necessary evil to encourage the creation and 
dissemination of socially useful works.30 A necessary corollary of this view is that the 
rewards of copyright should be no greater than is necessary to achieve the goal of 
disseminating socially valuable works. That is, copyright protection should have limits. 
These limits are reflected in the fact that copyright is not perpetuaf1 and that certain uses of 
copyright works are allowed.32 This balancing approach is clear in our own legislation 
through the enactment of various permitted uses, but the policy behind the balance is more 
overt in the United States constitutional statement of copyright:33 
2b 
27 
28 
2Y 
30 
31 
32 
:n 
The Congress shall have the power ... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries. 
Above n 3, ss 94-97. 
Above n 3, ss 98-101. 
Above n 3, s 107. 
The exclusive rights of the copyright owner are set out in section 16 of the Copyright Act 1994. 
Ginsberg J" A Tale of Two Copyrights" [1990) Tulane Law Review 991, 993. 
Duration of copyright is for life of the author plus 50 years for literary artistic, musical or dramatic 
works and other periods, usually 50 years, for other works. See Copyright Act 1994, ss 22-25. 
Above n 3, Part III. 
United States Constitution Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8. 
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The United States copyright law illustrates the public interest approach. The author 
centred approach lies at the heart of French copyright law, which in fact is entitled "droit 
d'auteur" which translates as authors' rights rather than copyright. The Anglo (New 
Zealand) approach sits somewhere in between. There are many common themes between 
these different jurisdictions. For example, although the origins of the authors' rights 
approach and the Anglo-American approach are generally regarded as different, a close 
analysis of their origins arguably reveals the difference is not in fact so great.-" 
C The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and particularly, section 14, which protects freedom 
of expression35 ought to play a role in interpreting copyright law.36 TVNZ v Newsmonito~7 
is the only New Zealand case to date where a court has considered the effect of the Bill of 
Rights Act on copyright. TVNZ claimed copyright in its news programmes. Newsmonitor 
video taped those programmes, provided its clients with summaries of the items and on 
request supplied clients with transcripts of those programmes for a fee. Newsmonitor argued 
that section 14 meant TVNZ's claim to copyright could not be upheld. Counsel for 
Newsmonitor argued that:3R 
the Copyright Act inhibits the free flow of information within the community by granting the 
originator of various works or products a statutory monopoly whereby that person may 
prevent others from doing certain acts in relation to them. [emphasis added) 
Blanchard J did not accept this argument on the basis that copyright law takes account 
of notions of freedom of speech by its adherence to the idea I expression dichotomy. 39 In its 
broadest sense the idea/ expression dichotomy means that copyright does not protect ideas 
but it protects the expression of those ideas. The difficulty with this dichotomy lies in 
drawing the line between what is an idea and what amounts to expression of that idea. 
Judge Learned Hand made one of the clearest statements of this difficulty:40 
34 Aboven30. 
35 Section 14 provides: Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
36 Section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 requires a court to prefer a meaning of any 
enactment which is consistent with the Bill of Rights. 
[1994] 2 NZLR 91. 
38 Above n 37, 95. 
39 Above n 37, 95. 
40 Nichols v Universal Pictures (1930), 45 F2d 119121. 
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D Economic Policy and Copyright 
There is a huge investment in intellectual property industries. New Zealand has the 
status of being a net user of copyright (ie it imports more copyright works than it exports) 
but nonetheless the value of New Zealand's copyright related mdustries is significant. 
Copyright now covers a greater diversity of subject matter than ever before. It is no longer 
confined to works like books and paintings, but has developed to cover modern arts like film 
and technologies such as computer programs, broadcasts, and cable programmes. It also 
protects industrial type works.44 
Intellectual property rights are now recognised as a sizeable part of international trade 
law. They are regarded as a necessary corollary to the principles of open markets and fair 
competition, which the World Trade Organisation embodies.' 5 The World Trade 
Organisation includes the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). This international agreement has placed an unheralded emphas1s on the 
significance of intellectual property to the world's leading trade powers. TRIPS deals with 
a number of aspects of intellectual property. In relation to copyright it provides that 
countries must recognise the minimum levels of copyright protection enshrined in Articles 1-
21 of the Berne Convention.46 In addition TRIPS prescribes addition protections. For 
example, rental rights in relation to films and computer prograrns.47 The economic value of 
copyright is a central justification for its modern form and structure. 
Intellectual property rights are part of New Zealand's overall competition policy.48 The 
structure of copyright law embodies features which in combination can protect against the 
creation of undesirable monopolies. Whether in practice it operates like this is a matter of 
some debate which is beyond the scope of this article.49 Those features include : 
• 
44 
45 
46 
47 
50 
only original works are protected50 ; 
For example, plastic kiwifruit trays: Plix Products v Frank M Winstone (Merchants) Limited (1984) 3 
IPR 390 and plastic components for drawers: LB (Plastics) Ltd v Swish Products Limited [1979] RPC 
623. 
See Jackson J, Davey W & Sykes Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (West Publishing, 
Minnesota, 1995). The World Trade Organisation Charter and Agreements are available online at 
[http:/ /www.wto.org/]. 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 24 July 1971). 
Article 11. 
Intellectual property policy advice is given to government from the Competition and Enterprise 
Branch of the Ministry of Commerce. 
See Bettig above n 2. 
Above n 16. Although the standard of originality is not a high threshold the law is clear that a 
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• copyright does not protect ideas or information but the expression thereof; 
• copyright is of limited duration51 ; and 
• certain uses of copyright works which would otherwise amount to an infringement are 
permitted. For example, fair dealing for research or private study.52 
In summary, competition law policy is part of the ethical basis of copyright law. 
III CASE LAW AND THE ETHICS OF COPYRIGHT 
Whether the justifications for copyright protection are politically or ethically 
acceptable is a matter for debate. Regardless of what opinion is held in that debate the case 
law should reflect the justifications for copyright law. It is difficult to measure a legal 
justification by looking at individual cases. It is unusual in New Zealand copyright cases 
for courts to discuss copyright justifications at length. However, justifications should be 
reflected in and recognisable from the reasoning and outcome of a judgment. Individual cases 
should not run counter to the overall justifications for copyright's existence. Many cases are 
finely balanced when a black letter law analysis is applied to the facts of an alleged 
copyright infringement. In such a situation the justifications for copyright should be the 
factors which tip the balance in favour of one or other party. This article argues that in 
New Zealand this is not always the case. 
The remainder of this article considers two cases which have proceeded to the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in recent years: Beckmann v Mayceys Confectionerl3 and Bleiman 
v News Media (Auckland) Ltd54 •• It argues that only one of the decisions reflects the 
justifications which form the ethical basis of copyright. 
IV BECKMANN V MAYCEYS CONFECTIONERY 
A The Facts and the Reasoning of the Court 
Mayceys manufactured and sold in New Zealand jelly confectionery in the shape of 
crocodiles and known as "killer crocs". Beckmann imported to New Zealand confectionery 
made by another manufacturer but also in the shape of crocodiles. Killer crocs were made 
from moulds based on a plaster model or sculpture.55 There was no dispute that Mayceys 
work is not original if it is copied from another work. 
51 Above n 31. 
52 Above n 3, s 43. 
53 Unreported, 13 October 1995, Court of Appeal, CA 187/94. 
54 [1994]3 NZLR 673. 
55 A model or sculpture qualifies as an artistic work under section 2 of the Copyright Act 1994. 
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owned the relevant copyright. The focus of the case was whether there had been an 
infringement. The High Court held that Mayceys' copyright had been infringed. Mr 
Beckmann appealed that judgment. 
This was not the first time the parties had a dispute over consumable crocodiles. Mr 
Beckmann previously had imported to New Zealand jelly crocodiles which had been 
directly copied from the killer crocs. That earlier dispute had been settled. The crocodile 
confectionery now in dispute had been made under Beckmann's clear instructions not to 
copy Mayceys' product. He instructed his supplier to create a crocodile sweet using a 
different mould maker and without reference to the killer crocs. 
On appeal, Gault J referred to two elements which "support the presumption that in 
making the alleged infringement the skill and effort that went into the creation of the original 
copyright work has been appropriated".56 Those two elements being the resemblance and the 
direct or indirect causallink.57 The Court notes that "[j]ust what degree of similarity there 
must be before it amounts to reproduction is never an easy matter to determine".58 The Court 
considered the level of originality of Mayceys' crocodiles was relevant to the issue of 
infringement. What is barely original will be scantily protected, or in the words of Gault J:5" 
If there is borne in mind the purpose for which the resemblance is assessed it is apparent that 
whether or not it is sufficient will depend in part on the originality and distinctiveness of the 
copyright work. If two artists sketch the same common object there will necessarily be close 
resemblance. Similarly in product design two designers will embody features dictated by 
known manufacturing constraints which will necessarily be similar. 
The Court ack:nowledged:60 
Anyone else is free to make a model of a crocodile and to use it to make moulds for jube 
production so long as they do not directly or indirectly copy [Mayceys) model or a substantial 
part of it. 
Gault J then compared the features of the Beckmann's and Mayceys' crocodiles and . 
concluded there was no infringement. There were "no features of striking similarity and 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Above n 53, 5. 
Similar elements were identified by Tipping J in Bonz Group (Pty) Ltd v Cooke [1994] 3 NZLR 91. 
He called them "objective similarity" and "causal connection". In addition he refers to 
substantiality of the part copied. 
Above n 53, 5. 
Above n 53, 5. 
Above n 53, 6. 
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[they] convey quite different overall impressions".61 Gault J deduced that the trial judge may 
have come to the opposite conclusion because:62 
His comparison was perhaps made without giving sufficient consideration to the fact that 
both articles are representations of a common animal the features of which are distinctive but 
not because of any creativity on the part of the copyright owner. 
This view of the trial judge's findings is very interesting. It appears to acknowledges that 
copyright should not be used to create a monopoly in the use of a common animal or object. 
Such a misuse of copyright law would defeat the justifications which form the ethical basis 
of copyright law. 
B How are the Ethics of Copyright Reflected in Mayceys? 
1 The Incentive Theory 
The decision in no way impairs any incentive to make confectionery. The incentive for 
manufacturers to produce sweets in crocodile and other animal shapes remains intact. Both 
parties and others still have an incentive to create these sorts of copyright works. There is 
sufficient reward for Mayceys' creative investment. Killer crocs may not be copied, they are 
protected. 
2 The Public Interest in Using Copyright Works and the Bill of Rights Act 
In Mayceys there was no argument that Beckmann's use of the Killer Crocs was fair 
dealing with the copyright work. It could not sensibly be argued that there was any fair 
dealing of the sort permitted by the Copyright Act 1994, such as research or private study,63 
criticism or review,64 or any sort of educational or public administration related use.65 In 
that sense the case raised no public interest issue. 
In a broad sense it could be argued that the case raised a freedom of expression issue. 
That is, it is arguably an unfair fetter on the right of freedom of expression for the use of a 
common animal to be restricted. However, this argument is more concisely justified by an 
examination of economic policy behind copyright protection. 
61 Above n 53, 10. 
62 Above n 53,10. 
63 Above n 3, s 43. 
64 Above n 3, s 42. 
65 Above n 3. ss 44-66. 
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3 Economic Policy and Copyright 
Mayceys represents the balance between protecting copyright works but limiting that 
protection so that the justifications for copyright are not undermined. The decision 
acknowledges that anyone may create a copyright work based on a crocodile and copyright 
should not be used to create a form of monopoly in a common object. The case recognises that 
because the original features of a crocodile are not what copyright protects, in relation to 
the killer crocs, Mayceys should not obtain a right to prevent others from using crocodiles 
in making confectionery. Although the court does not rely on "idea/ expression" 
terminology it recognised the concept of the idea/expression dichotomy in its broade~t 
sense. The "idea" of crocodile confectionery is not protected, but the particular expression 
is. The Court's actual reasoning was that a substantial part of Mayceys' actual expression 
of a crocodile had not be appropriated. 
V BLEIMAN V NEWS MEDIA (AUCKLAND) LTD 
A The Facts and the Reasoning of the Court 
In 1994 the Court of Appeal considered an appeal from Blanchard J's refusal to grant an 
interlocutory injunction to restrain News Media from publishing "any competition garre 
having features said to have been copied from games devised initially by the first appellant 
and developed and published pursuant to an arrangement with him by the second 
appellant" .66 
Mr Bleiman, the first appellant, had created a competition game which he called 
"Fantasy League". The garre first appeared in Rugby League Week under that title. As the 
competition game progressed it also appeared under the heading "follow your progress". 
The judgment describes the rules of the game which essentially involve participants selecting 
a team of players in scoring positions. Each scoring player is selected from a group of 
possible players for that position. The selection of these players creates a "fantasy team". A 
competition participant obtains points if the real players represented in the fantasy team 
score points in real matches. Mr Bleiman's own affidavit described how he based the garre 
on similar games in the United States.67 Shortly after the appellants' game appeared the 
respondents published a similar game under the heading "Fantasy Footy". The appellants 
applied to the High Court for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondents from 
publishing their game. The respondents undertook to change the look of their game by not 
using the words "fantasy" or "fantastic", not using the heading "follow you progress" and 
not adopting a layout with boxes containing the names and positions of players on the right 
66 Above 11 54. 
67 Above 11 54, 675. 
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hand side of the page. The respondent's changed the look of their game accordingly - the 
altered game had the boxes containing the names and positions on the left hand side. 
The statutory presumptions of subsistence and ownership were relied on because the 
existence of copyright was not disputed. The focus of the case was whether there was an 
infringement of copyright. At first instance Blanchard J did not consider there was a serious 
issue to be tried. The respondents had made sufficient alterations to the presentation of their 
game. He held there was "no copying of the plaintiff's text- the means of expression - which 
is what literary copyright protects".68 On appeal Gault J held there was a serious question 
to be tried:69 
In the present case we consider that it is arguable that even in the modified version of the 
game ... there is sufficient objective similarity to the appellants' works and ample basis for the 
inference it was derived from those works. The whole essence of the game was taken and 
retained. The features taken arguably go beyond mere ideas or concepts. It is not unarguable 
that the respondent did much more than copy general ideas embodied in the game and 
undertake its own independent work in devising the game. If the respondent had sought to 
design a game to be played through its newspaper based on the achievements of individual 
players in the national rugby competition the likelihood of a result incorporating all the 
features of the appellants' game would be remote indeed. 
In reaching its conclusion Gault J relied on Elanco v Mandopl0 a case involving a leaflet 
containing instructions regarding a herbicide and incorporating publicly available 
scientific information. In that case the defendants had copied the plaintiffs leaflet and then 
altered it. The court held that there was an arguable case of infringement as the defendants 
did not sufficiently cure the infringement by altering the original work. The court held the 
defendants should have used the public information to produce their own leaflet from 
scratch. Gault J considered Bleiman was analogous to Elanco. He regarded the respondent's 
altered version of its game as no more than modifications of the earlier version which did 
not cure the infringement.71 
With respect, it is submitted that there is a substantial difference between the copying at 
issue in the Elanco and Bleiman cases. The actual text was copied in Elanco. In Bleiman the 
text was not copied, any similarity was in the layout. The features which were similar in 
the Bleiman case were arguably commonplace layout features. This was certainly the view 
6Y 
70 
71 
Above n 54, 676. 
Above n 54, 678. 
[1980] RPC 213. 
Above n 54, 679. 
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at first instance. In the words of Blanchard J in the High Court "the use of boxes is a trite 
feature ... a very obvious and rommon presentation".n Furthermore, the final sentence of 
Gault J's quote above is debatable. The similarities between the final two games are so 
commonplace that it is hard to see why any similar sort of competition would not necessitate 
a similar look. The function of the competition involved picking individual players from 
several different groups of players. This inevitably required the listing of those groups so 
that they can easily be differentiated from each other. This aspect of the expression is 
dictated by function not by the originality of the plaintiff's work.73 
B How are the Ethics of Copyright Reflected in Bleiman? 
1 The Incentive Theory 
The result in Bleiman has the superficial appeal of protecting the authorial labour and 
effort expended in creating the appellants' game. However, it is submitted that the Court of 
Appeal did not achieve an even balance between the necessary reward and the appellants' 
creative investment. The outcome was skewed in favour of the reward. Arguably, there is 
now no incentive for the appellants to develop their existing competition, or to create new 
competitions, because of the substantial copyright protection received for its existing 
competition. Such a reward does not only not fulfil the aim of encouraging creativity, but it 
looks like a form of unacceptable monopoly. 
2 The Public Interest in Using Copyright Works 
The court's reasons for finding that the respondent's game infringed the appellants' 
copyright makes it is difficult to see how any one could create this sort of sports competition 
without infringing the appellants' copyright. 
The Court of Appeal's reasoning, as quoted above, appears to leave open the possibility 
that a third party could independently create such a competition game and end up with a 
different looking game from the appellants. It is submitted that this is doubtful because of the 
significance placed on the use of features which are arguably commonplace. This decision 
virtually gives a monopoly to the appellants to create games of this sort in the field of rugby, 
and possibly other sports, in New Zealand. 
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It is also arguable that the originality of the work in Bleiman should have been challenged. The 
literary work in Elanco was the result of substantial research and piecing together of relevant 
information. Bleiman's own affidavit stated the fantasy football game was adapted from similar 
games for other sports in the United States. While this no doubt involved some labour, that labour 
is arguably minimal. 
This is analogous to the "features dictated by known manufacturing constraints" referred to in 
Mayceys. See above n 54. 
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3 Economic Policy and Copyright 
Bleiman results in a limitation on the creation of similar competition games which is 
contrary to an economic policy which discourages that sort of restriction. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The judgment of Mayceys v Beckmann accurately applied a number of aspects of the 
justifications for copyright law. With respect, the Bleiman reasoning did not. The 
justifications for copyright protection form the ethical bases of copyright law. It is 
important that the justifications for protection are remembered so that copyright protection 
is applied consistently and, in as far as is possible, predictably. 
